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My discussion of policy issues and research opportunities in industrial
organization is principally concerned with issues where the analyses of
firm and market structures overlap, with special attention to matters that
fall within the ambit of antitrust enforcement. I take the position that a
re-examination of the implicit assumptions of conventional firm and
market models is needed if antitrust analysts are accurately to assess
the properties of the modern corporation and the markets within which
it operates. I suggest, in this connection, that an "institutional failures"
orientation—to include an assessment of the failures of internal or-
ganization (administrative processes) as well as failures of product and
capital markets—can usefully be adopted by students of antitrust eco-
nomics.
Among the matters that come under review are the influence of
product market failures (of both conventional and unconventional sorts)
on the dominant firm condition and on vertical integration. Failures in
the capital market as these relate to conglomerate organization are also
examined. But no discussion of firm and market structures is complete
without calling attention to the limits of internal organization. Markets,
after all, do not fail absolutely, but only in relation to some nonmarket
alternative (Arrow, 1969, p. 48). Focusing, as I attempt to, on the
transactional relations that occur within and between firms and markets
makes especially evident that internal organization and market processes
can, for many purposes, usefully be regarded as substitutes.
The differences between this and the usual industrial organization
approach warrant explication. It is not, I think, a caricature to say that
the internal organization of the firm, including the allocation of func-
tions between firms and markets, is of concern to traditional analysis
Note: Research on this paper has been supported by a grant from The
Brookings Institution. It is part of a larger study. also supported by Brookings.
The opinions expressed are my own.Industrial Organization 17
mainly as this can be said to influence "market power" and "offensive
business conduct." By contrast, I treat the question of organizational
design as intrinsically interesting and inseparably associated with effi-
ciency considerations. Firms become devices for alleviating market fric-
(failures) by activities that might otherwise be per-
formed by the market. The limitations of firms for these purposes, while
real, are a function of organization form. The study of organizational
innovations, consequently, is a matter of special interest. Altogether,
the approach that I am advocating is one of "transactional analysis of a
comparative-institutional sort." While there is no essential conflict be-
tween this and "market power analysis" of the usual variety (indeed
they ought to be regarded as complements), the research programs sug-
gested by each are quitt different.
I conclude that an ipcomplete treatment of the dominant firm prob-
lem in economics has led to an incorrect characterization of the monop-
oiy problem by the law, and that antitrust has been undiscriminating in
its treatment of both vertical and conglomerate structures. In more nu-
merous respects than are generally recognized, vertical integration and
conglomerate organizatiOn permit transactional failures (in the product
and capital markets, respectively) to be attenuated.
I. DOMINANT FIRM INDUSTRIES
Issues
Antitrust is on its most familiar ground when dealing with con-
ventional monopoly problems that take the form of horizontal market
power. The underlying economic theory here is thought to be relatively
well developed and its applications obvious. Still, neither the courts nor
the enforcement agencies have been prepared seriously to challenge pre-
existing market power that takes the form of a dominant firm.
As the law is currently interpreted, dominance does not constitute a
Section 2 monopoly violation if the structure in question is attributable
to "a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident." 1Al-
though, in practice, the courts may never explicitly entertain defenses to
dominance along any of these lines, merely to offer them in principle
has enforcement significance: the enforcement agencies are precluded
from using any of these hypothetical defenses as an affirmative reason
for bringing a case. That, in these circumstances, dominant firm corn-
1UnitedStates v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).18 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
plaints rely mainly on alleged conduct offenses is only to be expected.
This often reduces them, however, to contrived cases, and legitimate
issues are suppressed.
Evaluation
Dominant firm industries will be defined, provisionally, to be in-
dustries for which the output of the dominant firm has persistently ex-
ceeded 60 per cent of the industry total. The dominant firms in such
industries will ordinarily enjoy supernormal rates of return—at least
potentially if not actually.2 Two issues are especially relevant in assessing
the dominant firm condition: How did dominance develop? What reme-
dies, if any, ought to be invoked?
The usual assumption, implicit if not explicit, in most treatments
of the dominant firm issue is that "competition works"—at least in the
limited sense that extant and potential rivals can be relied upon to per-
form self-policing functions by responding appropriately to opportuni-
ties for private gain. But for circumstances in which economies of scale
are large in relation to the market, patent protection exists, or illegal
practices are employed, persistent dominance with monopoly returns is
not to be expected. Still, reference by the Court to business acumen
and historic accident defenses reveals a chink in the workability argument
that just possibly warrants closer attention. Ought differential expertise
and chance event effects to be regarded as manifestations of market
failure, and what are the policy implications?
It is proposed here that differential expertise in amounts sufficient
to support dominance be regarded as a failure in the market for man-
agerial talent. This can take either of two forms. First, the requisite
talents may simply be scarce. Thus although it is usually assumed that
the supply of managerial talent is quite adequate (Kaysen and Turner,
1959, pp. 9, 117), at least occasionally this may not be true. Marschak,
in a related context, puts the issue as follows: "There exist almost unique,
irreplaceable research workers, teachers, administrators; just as there
exist unique choice locations for plants and harbors. The problem of
unique or imperfectly standardized goods...hasbeen neglected by
the textbooks" (1968, p. 14). The possibility that the dominant firm
has gained ascendancy because of the inimitable quality of its manage-
ment at least warrants consideration.
2Sometimesthese firms may be run slack, in which case reported profit will
not disclose the full supernormal profit potential.Industrial Organization 19
This is not, however, the only possibility. The dominant firm may
have displayed no special management expertise but existing and po-
tential rivals, on which the responsibility for self-policing functions de-
volves, may have been inept. Persistent ineptitude of this
sort is an indication that the self-policing functions of rivalry have lapsed.
Such discreditable performance on the part of principal rivals during
critical formative stages of an industry's development willbereferred to
as default failure.
Whether, however,default failure outcome is more than a hypo-
thetical possibility—to be conceded in principle but not observed in
practice—is perhaps todoubted. Relevant in this connection is the
experience of the diesel locomotive industry, where an argument not
only can but has been advanced that the dominance by General Motors
in diesel locomotive manufacture is to be explained by default failure
among the steam locomçaive firms.3 Although this record needs to be
more thoroughly developed and documented, I find the evidence more
than suggestive that General Motors' dominance of this industry was the
result of ineptitude on the part of the steam locomotive manufacturers
and imperceptiveness among potential rivals.
Consider now the accident defense. Dominance that results
from an unusual run of luck will be referred to as chance event failure.
The dominant firm and its rivals may be performing in a fully creditable
(yet unexceptional) manner, but the dominant firm is thrust ahead by
an unusual sequence of fortuitous events.
The extensive on stochastic determinants of firm size is
relevant in this connection. The usual and simplest assumption here is
that all firms in an industry prospectively have access to identical mean
growth rates, with actual rates being assigned at random from a com-
mon probability distribution. In the absence of serial correlation, a firm
that experiences high growth in one period may easily "draw" a low
growth rate in the next; no special advantage need obtain. Occasionally,
however, a firm may enjoy an unusual run of luck; a series of super-
normal growth rates are strung together. Where this happens, the lucky
firm can be thrust into a position of dominance. Moreover, the dominance
outcome, once realized, may not easily be undone by continued applica-
tion of the same stochastic mechanism: "Once the most fortunate firms
See the testimony, exhibits, of C. R. Osborne in A Siudyof the
Antitrust Laws, Hearings the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Mo-
nopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary,84th Cong.,1stSess.,Part8,
December 9, 1955, D.C., 1956, pp. 3948—97.20 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
climb well ahead of the pack, it is difficult for laggards to rally and
rectify the imbalance, for by definition, each firm—large and small—
has an equal chance of growing by an equal percentage amount"
(Scherer, 1970, p. 127). If indeed the variance in growth rates declines
as an industry matures and technical progress slackens, the prospect that
a dominant firm outcome once established will subsequently be upset (in
any short period .of time) by chance market processes is correspondingly
impaired.
As a policy matter, it would seem appropriate to regard both default
and chance event failures that result in dominance as indications that
the self-policing properties of the market, in these respects, have broken
down. Intervention by the government on grounds of "residual responsi-
bility" to restore a more competitive outcome is arguably appropriate.
New bases upon which to rest a Section 2 violation that do not rely ex-
clusively or primarily on conduct offenses would in this way become
available to the enforcement agencies. Moreover, structural relief, where
either default or chance event failures are established (and countervailing
considerations do not obtain), is presumably warranted. Altogether,
more assertive antitrust enforcement toward the dominant firm industries
would emerge.
It might be noted that Turner (1969) has recenfly reached a similar
policy conclusion concerning dominant firm industries—albeit on some-
what different grounds. Turner appeals to "reasonableness" considerations
in suggesting that, but for scale economy or unexpired patent defenses,
"it is appropriate to put a time limit on continuing monopoly power that
rests in part on earlier success, regardless of how the early success was
achieved" (p. 1219). The advantage of the present argument is that im-
plementing such a proposal is more attractive where significant default
or chance event failures can be shown to have occurred.
The position of Posner (1969, pp. 1596—98) on persistent mo-
nopoly can also be assessed in the light of the above argument. Posner
objects to Section 2 dissolution proceedings as a means for dealing with
persistent dominance on the grounds that monopoly positions not sup-
ported by scale economies, predatory behavior, superior skill, or forgone
monopoly gains will usually be eliminated by market processes. One
can agree, especially, if the time horizon stipulated is sufficiently long.
If, however, a dominant firm position, once secured, may be undone by
unassisted market processes only with difficulty, a policy of waiting for
self-correcting measures to be effective in a market where the dominanceIndustrial Organization 21
outcome has resulted from chance event or default failures is, perhaps,
excessively passive. Unusual measures may be indicated when the un-
usual event obtains.4
Research Opportunities
However one comes out on the policy ramifications of the argument,
it is a matter of scientific interest that a series of focusedindustrystudies
of the dominant firm industries be conducted. Can default or chance
event failures reasonably be established, or is the dominant firm out-
come invariably to be attributed to scale economies, unexpired original
patents, or illegal conduct? The matter can be approached directly, by
examining both the of the decisions taken by the dominant
firm's principal rivals (default failure) and the stochastic experience of
the industry (chance events)andindirectly, by assessing the conven-
tional scale economy, patent, and conduct conditions. But for nontrivial
scale economy, patent, or conduct effects, or unless management su-
periority claims can be supported, default or chance event failures are
presumably to be inferred. Claims of management superiority are dif-
ficult to evaluate in any simple way, but the study of organizational in-
novations, with special attention to changes in organization form, may
sometimes permit indirect inferences to be made. [See in this connection
Chandler (1966) and Williamson (1970).]
None of this requires that the relief question be reached. If, how-
ever, as a policy matter,question of dissolution is seriously to be con-
sidered, it is further necessary to examine both the human and physical
assets in the dominant firm. Should a study reveal that the requisite
managerial and technical capabilities are impacted, in the sense that
these cannot easily be assembled by unassisted market processes, any
4Posnerargues that inasmuch as "a recent study [Brozen's (1970)]
found that a high level of concentration in an industry tends to dissipate by
natural forces within an average period of 10 years...[and the average
length of a divestiture proceeding in a monopolization case involving a major
regional or national market' is 8 years,. . .itseems unlikely that administrative
methods of will work significantly more rapidly than the market"
(1970, p. 417, n. 50). The argument has merit but relies heavily on average
market tendencies which,the particular cases of very high concentration that
we are concerned with here, may be unwarranted. It also takes prevailing judicial
practices as given,despite, reform proposals concerning thismatter[see,for
example, the Neale Task Force Report (1969)].
Examination of unanticipated technical and market developments as well
as product life cyc!e effectsrelevant to an assessment of chance event failures.22 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
dissolution effort ought presumably to attempt tO transfer human as
well as physical capital in amounts sufficient to assure viability.
II. VERTICAL INTEGRATION 6
Issues
The study of vertical integration has presented difficulties at both
theoretical and policy levels of analysis. Vertical integration has never
enjoyed a secure place in value theory because under conventional as-
sumptions it is an anomaly: If the costs of operating competitive mar-
kets are zero, "as is usually assumed in our theoretical analysis" (Arrow,
1969, p. 48), why integrate?
Policy interest in vertical integration has been concerned mainly
with the possibility that integration can be used strategically to achieve
anticompetitive effects. In the absence of a more substantial theoretical
foundation, vertical integration, as a public policy matter, is typically
regarded as having dubious if not outright antisocial properties. Tech-
nological interdependencies (as in flow process operations) or, possibly,
observational economies, constitute the principal exceptions.
There is, nevertheless, a distinct unease over the argument. This is
attributable, probably, to a suspicion that the firm is more than a simple
efficiency instrument, in the usual scale economies and efficient factor
proportions senses of the term, but also possesses coordinating potential
that sometimes transcends that of the market. It is the burden of the
present argument that this suspicion is warranted.
Evaluation
That product markets have remarkable coordinating properties is,
among economists at least, a secure proposition. That product markets
are subject to failure in various respects and that internal organization
may be substituted against the market in these circumstances is, if some-
what less familiar, scarcely novel. A systematic treatment of market
failure as it bears on vertical integration, however, has not emerged.
Partly this is attributable to inattention to internal organization: The
remarkable properties of firms that distinguish internal from market
coordination have been neglected. But the fragmented nature of the
market failure literature as it bears on vertical integration has also con-
tributed to this condition; the extensive variety of circumstances in
8Theargument in this section relies extensively on Williamson (1971).Industrial Organization 23
which "internalization" (the substitution of internal organization for the
market) is attractive tehds not to be fully appreciated.
The properties of the firm that commend internal organization as
a market substitute would appear to fall into three categories: incentives,
controls, and what may be referred to broadly as "inherent structural
advantages." In an incentive sense, internal organization attenuates the
aggressive advocacy th4t epitomizes arm's length bargaining. Interests,
if not perfectly harmonized, are at least free of representations of a
narrowly opportunistic sort; in any viable group, of which the firm is
one, the range of admissible intraorganizational behavior is bounded by
considerations of In circumstances, therefore, where pro-
tracted bargaining between independent parties to a transaction can
otherwise be anticipated internalization becomes attractive.
Perhaps the most distinctive advantage of the firm, however, is
the wider variety and gteater sensitivity of control instruments that are
available for enforcing intrafirm in comparison with interfirm activities.
Not only is the firm able to perform more precise own-performance
evaluations (both conte4iporaneous and ex post) than can a buyer, but
its reward and penalty (which include selective use of em-
ployment, promotion, remuneration, and internal resource allocation
processes) are more refined. Moreover, when conflicts develop, the
firm possesses a compar4tively efficient conflict resolution machinery.
To illustrate, fiat is frequently a more efficient way to settle minor
conflicts (say, differences of interpretation) than is haggling or litigation.
tnterorganizational can be settled by fiat only rarely, if at all.
For one thing, the parties would have to agree on an impartial arbitrator,
an agreement which itself might be costly to secure. Also rules of evidence
and procedure would have to be established. If, moreover, the occasion
for such interorganizational settlements were to be common, the form
of organization converged in effect to vertical integration, with the arbiter
becoming a manager in fact if not in name. By contrast, intraorganiza-
tional settlements by are common (Whinston, 1964, pp. 410—14).
The firm may also resort to internalization on account of defects in
the prevailing institutional arrangements. The dysfunctional consequences
of faulty property rights SP; ecifications, for example, may be overcome by
common ownership. Also the firm may offer a more efficient communi-
cation network.
The firm, however, experiences genuine limitations in relation
to the market. Mainly on account of bounded rationality and greater
confidence in the objectivity of market exchange in comparison with24 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
bureaucratic processes, market mediation is generally to be preferred
over internal supply in circumstances in which markets may be said to
"work well." Therefore the question is, when may markets be expected
to display defects—which brings us to the matter of market failure.
This aspect of the argument has been developed at some length
elsewhere.7 It reduces to the following series of propositions: the sub-
stitution of internal organization for product market exchange becomes
relatively more attractive (1) as contractual incompleteness risks be-
come great, (2) as the risks of strategic misrepresentation in interfirm
transactions increase, and (3) where market exchange suffers from what
may be referred to as "intrinsic inefficiency," especially as this bears on
the convergence of expectations. Small numbers of traders, product com-
plexity, and technical and market uncertainties exacerbate these condi-
tions and thereby encourage the internalization of transactions.
Typically, the conclusion of the conventional analysis of vertical
integration—which focuses principally on market power considerations—
is that, but for flow process operations where materials handling econo-
mies are said to be available, the sources of cost saving from integration
are "unclear." Transactional analysis, by contrast, reveals that vertical
integration may permit the realization of transactional economies over
a much wider class of activities. The critical point, as a policy matter,
is that in consideration of the variety of circumstances in which product
market failures can occur and the potentially attractive properties that
internal organization possesses as a market substitute, the a priori case for
vertical integration is much more extensive than is commonly realized. If,
therefore, contrary to the usual assumptions, vertical integration between
successive stages of production often permits real cost savings, its eco-
nomic consequences in this respect cannot be regarded with indifference.
Vertical merger guidelines,8 which make no apparent allowance for these
effects but focus exclusively on the potential anticompetitive conse-
quences of vertical integration, may, accordingly, warrant reconsider-
ation.
Research Opportunities
The argument above, assuming that itis correct, by no means
exhausts the issues that vertical integration raises. For one thing, a
The interested reader is referred to Williamson (1971).
8Seethe Merger Guidelines of the Department of Justice, 1968; see also
Stigler (1968, pp. 302-304).Industrial Organization 25
paralleltreatment of the sources and consequences of the failures of
internal organizationthey relate to vertical integration is needed.° In
addition, the above argument requires qualification in that it applies
strictly to the vertical integration of production. Although much of it may
have equal relevance to backward integration into raw materials and
forward integration into distribution, I conjecture that the affirmative
case for vertical integration may often be less compelling where control
over raw materials or 'distributional channels is involved and that the
anticompetitive potentiól of vertical integration into either of these stages
is especially great. A more discriminating approach toward vertical
mergers—depending not merely on market shares but also on the stage
of economic activity affected and the absolute size of the organization—
could easily emerge.
Also relevant tounderstanding of vertical integration is the
study of intermediate forms of market organization that fall between full
integration and arm's length bargaining. Such an investigation may be
especially productiverevealing the limits of the firm as an integrating
device. The franchise system is of special interest, both in organizational
and antitrust terms. What are the incentive and other properties that
make it an attractive form of organization? In what types of circum-
stances does this occur? What contractual limitations (customer, product,
territorial, etc.) facilitate efficient exchange and might reasonably be
allowed, and when do such limitations have anticompetitive effects? Dis-
tinguishing pecuniary from "full price" [in the sense of Becker
(1965)] may be for assessing the monopolistic consequences of
such restrictions.
The argument could also be brought to bear on historic trends
toward vertical integration (including disintegration) in individual indus-
tries. Are these developments mainly to be explained by reference to
°Ofspecial interest in this connection is the matter of foreclosure. It is often
said that vertical integration poses an antitrust problem because nonintegrated
firms are forecfosed from securing business that would otherwise be open to
competition. Unfavorable market power and unfair competition effects are said
to obtain. The economic rationale for these claims has frequently been unclear,
however; other students of 'verticalintegration have expressed doubts that fore-
closure has any unfavorable economic effects whatsoever. I submit that distin-
guishing between economic and bureaucratic rationality may help to clarify the
issues. Behavior that to Jack merit, and consequently is dismissed when re-
garded in economic terms, may not be so bizarre when evaluated as a bureaucratic
phenomenon. This distinction between economic and bureaucratic rationality may
also be useful in examining other business conduct practices. Itis elementary
that, where opportunity large, bureaucratic preferences may govern.26 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
technical scale economies and diseconomies [cf. Stigler (1951)1, or by
the interfirm versus intrafirm transactional approach proposed here [and
originally advocated by Coase (1937)]? Have recent developments in
the study of transactional Costs and market failures, together with an
emerging appreciation of the properties of firms that commend internal
organization as a product market substitute, now made it possible to
apply transactional analysis to explain historic trends in vertical integra-
tion and related firm and market structures effectively? Put differently,
is transactional analysis a research strategy whose time has come?
III. CONGLOMERATE ORGANIZATION
Issues
Industrial organization specialists have been actively concerned with
the conglomerate phenomenon at least since Edwards's 1955 treatment
of the subject. As Edwards saw it, conglomerate bigness gave rise to
monopoly power in subtle but significant ways. Stocking, however, in
commenting on the various and diffuse effects described by Edwards,
found that most of the alleged anticompetitive consequences could be
traced to original monopoly power of a conventional sort. He conceded,
nevertheless, that the conglomerate corporation posed significant institu-
tional issues for which conventional theory was inadequate (Stocking,
1955, pp. 358—59).
The dialogue has continued, most recently being a subject for high-
level regulatory review in connection with the Merger Guidelines of the
Department of Justice, two Presidential Task Force reports dealing with
current antitrust problems, and a Federal Trade Commission Staff Report.
The emphasis throughout, both in the earlier literature as well as the
more recent policy treatments of the issue, has been on the alleged anti-
competitive consequences of the conglomerate form of organization.
Such a narrow focus is perhaps appropriate if, as an efficiency mat-
ter, the distribution of functions between firms and markets can be
regarded with indifference; the principal issues then can be reduced to
an application of basic (or extended) monopoly theory to the particular
circumstances at hand. If, however, internalization often has significant
effects on efficiency, such an approach is arguably too narrow.'°
10have argued elsewhere that organizational innovation, of which the
conglomerate is a recent manifestation, often has had (and can be expected to
have) remarkable efficiency consequences (Williamson, 1970). The argument, asIndustrial Organization 27
Evaluation
Whereas vertical integration involves the substitution of administra-
tive for market processes in response to product market failures,
the conglomerate canregarded mainly as a substitution of internal for
market organization in response to failures in the capital market."
The capital market has two general functions to perform: funds metering
and the supply of ince4tives, of both reward and penalty types. The
extent to which the capital market is engaged in funds metering, however,
is severely limited by prejvailing retained earnings practices. Baumol con-
cludes from his study of
1thisfunction that "the stock market is only in-
frequently given the opportunity to discipline directly the vast majority of
the nation's leading corpdrations" (Baumol, 1965, p. 76). 12Anexamina-
tion of the incentive properties of the capital market also reveals defects.
The external relation the capital market bears to the firm places it at a
serious information disadvantage and thus, because of high imputation
costs, limits the of selective reward procedures. This external
relation also prevents the capital market from intervening selectively to
correct local conditions. displacement, which is an extreme
corrective response, incuts significant original and secondary costs.
The conglomerate internalizes both incentive and metering func-
tions. As an internal control mechanism with constitutional authority,
expertise, and low-cost access to the requisite data, itis able both to
employ additional and penalty instruments and to exercise these
in selective and preventative ways that are unavailable to an external
controlagent. As afunds-metering instrument,the conglomerate
itapplies to the transformation of the enterprise from a unitary to a multi-
divisional form at least, is supported by the application of a priori theory to the
problems of managing comj,lex, hierarchical, human organizations; by Alfred
Chandler, Jr.'s, historical survey of early twentieth century corporate developments
(Chandler, 1966); by natural selection considerations; and by a casual review of
the conspicuous evidence.
1
11 Theextent to which this substitution can be expected to be efficacious
depends on the internal of the firm and the control apparatus employed.
The argument here is restriQted to divisionalized conglomerate organizations in
which strategic decision-making functions(including resource allocation)are
assigned to a strong generai office and in which a sensitive internal control
apparatus has been assembled. For an elaboration, see Williamson (1970).
12Alsorelevant inthis connectionisthe Baumol etal.(1970)article
concerning marginal rates of return to alternative sources of funds. The finding
that very low rates of return are associated with internal sources of capital
reinforces the argument in the text that the funds-metering function of the capital
market is incompletely realized.28 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
(ideally) assigns cash flows on the basis of prospective yields instead of
allowing them to be retained by the sectors from which they originate. In
both these respects, therefore, the conglomerate (potentially at least) 13
can be regarded as a miniature capital market. In the absence, therefore,
of countervailing considerations not already reflected in current merger
policy toward conglomerates, and assuming that the enforcement of the
merger statutes with regard to horizontal and vertical combinations is to
remain severe, a more sympathetic attitude toward conglomerate organ-
ization would seem to be warranted. Not only are the immediate effi-
ciency gains in funds metering and the supplying of incentives to be
valued, but an active market for corporate control (Manne, 1965) is
also promoted.
Recent policy proposals concerning conglomerates,'4 however, ap-
pear to give no weight to these factors. Based on alleged reciprocity and
cross-subsidization dangers together with expressed concern over poten-
tial competition effects, enforcement criteria have been tentatively ad-
vanced which, if implemented, would relieve several hundred large firms
from the forces of competition in the capital market, forces which prob-
ably ought to be supported rather than suppressed. Protective efforts by
the enforcement agencies to defeat takeover efforts where. members of the
"business establishment" are the target firms are similarly suspect.15
Exclusive antitrust concern with competition in the product market
(narrowly regarded), to the neglect of competition in the capital market,
can result in a perversion of the enforcement process. If, as I have argued
elsewhere (1970, pp. 145—50), conglomerate mergers pose genuine
public policy issues(in both economic and sociopolitical respects)
mainly in a systems sense involving acquisitions by already giant-sized
firms, the indicated delimitation of conglomerate merger enforcement is
to direct it explicitly toward the giant-sized subset.
Of course not all firms in the giant-sized subset would be affected
either by a dominant firm program of the sort suggested in section I or
by a tougher policy toward mergers involving giant-sized enterprise. Un-
less other economic grounds are advanced, therefore, or unless antitrust
were to expand its scope to include noneconomic considerations, many
giant-sized enterprises would elude the antitrust enforcement net. For
those who take the position that antitrust should not be converted into
See the qualifications in Williamson (1970, Chap. 10).
14 Especially the Neale Task Force Report (1969) and the FTC Staff Study
(1969).
15 For an illustration, see Williamson (1970, pp. 100—102, 171).Industrial Organization 29
an instrument for reconstituting firmsizefor sociopolitical reasons, such
an escape is altogether appropriate. However one comes out on this
matter, itis relevant to observe that antitrust is not the only policy
instrument that can be brought to bear. The voluntary divestiture pro-
grams that some large corporations have recently been observed to
engage in are of special interest in this regard.16
Some, perhaps many, of these voluntary divestitures have been
undertaken in response to pressing cash needs in the face of high interest
rates. Others, however, well have been undertaken out of recognition
that large size and proliferating variety eventually result in diseconomies.
The parent organizatiofi is induced on this account voluntarily to split
off some of its operating divisions—either as independent economic
entities, as spinoffs (in which some financial interest is retained), or
for acquisition by others. This process of "mitosis" represents a variety
of organizational self-renewal that warrants a sympathetic public policy
response. Not only does it promise operating efficiencies, and on this
account alone is to be: valued, but it also serves to relieve legitimate
sociopolitical concerns over wealth concentration tendencies inthe
largest corporations.
Research Opportunities
As a research matter, an effort to categorize conglomerate merger
activity according to motive and effect is needed. The discussion above
emphasizes economic efficiency dimensions of the conglomerate, but it
is clearly a more complex phenomenon than that. Many of these issues
relate more to tax and securities regulations than to industrial organiza-
tion per se and might better be pursued by other specialists. A
full treatment of the conglomerate phenomenon nevertheless requires
that these other factors be assessed.
Of greater interest to industrial organization specialists is the in-
fluence of internal structure on performance. Studies of the effects of
industry structure on performance are part of the core commitment of
industrial organization; cross-sectional studies relating industry structure
to performance are common. It is proposed here, however, that the in-
ternal structure of the firm (organization form) be introduced as an
explanatory variable and that the conglomerate be regarded less as a dis-
tinctive organization form itself than as a diversified manifestation of
16SeeForbes, May 1., 1970, pp. 214—20; also Business Week, August 15,
1970, pp. 86—87.30 Economic Research: Retrospect and Prospect
either the multidivisional or free-form structure (Williamson, 1970, pp.
142—43,162).
Although the analysis of organization form itself is at a very primi-
tive stage of development (and, consequently, only crudest variety
of classification scheme exists)itwould be interesting to examine the
influence of internal structure on performance in the following respects:
comparative growth and profit rates among rival firms; marginal rates of
return to alternative sources of funds; evidence relating to slack (internal
efficiency), perhaps especially in relation to business conditions; evidence
relating to internal operating practices, such as cross-subsidization; evi-
dence bearing on "offensive" marketing practices, such as reciprocity.'8
It is probably essential, for the purposes of such studies, to make allow-
ance for firm size effects.
Of related interest is the historical evolution of the multidivision
form. Chandler (1966) traces much of this in descriptive terms, but a
more formal assessment of this organizational innovation, including its
diffusion, would seem indicated. Which firms with what characteristics
have been first to employ multidivisionalization in their respective in-
dustries, and what factors explain the degree of rapidity with which
imitation by rivals has occurred?
An effort to discover the quantitative significance of organizational
innovation as it affects aggregate growth rates would be ambitious but
not necessarily intractable. What fraction of the residual term in con-
ventional growth models can reasonably be imputed to organizational
developments?
Also of interest in this regard is the link between technical and or-
ganizational innovation. In what respects have developments of the
organizational innovation type altered the locus of technical innovative
activity and with what performance consequences? To what extent and
in what circumstances does technical innovation take an interorganiza-
tional rather than intraorganizational route? Is interfirm exchange—in
which different firms with distinctive attributes participate in the inven-
17 The following structural distinctions would seem appropriate from the
outset: unitary form, multidivision form, free form, and "other." For a discussion,
see Williamson (1970). The need to create additional categories may be evident
as the study of internal structure proceeds.
18 Again, the distinction between economic and bureaucratic rationality re-
ferred to in footnote 9 may be useful. There are bureaucratic reasons to expect
performance in these respects to vary systematically with organization form, while
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tion, development, and final supply stages—really viable? What factors
impair its effective operation, and what are the policy implications? 19
Thepurpose, frequency, and magnitude of voluntary divesti-
ture efforts need more thoroughly to be documented. Also, consideration
ought to be given to means by which to supply incentives that make
voluntary divestiture attractive; this may indeed be the most promis-
ing approach to the bigness per se issue. At a minimum, existing tax
disincentives to voluntary divestiture ought to be reviewed. Freeing the
market for corporate ought also to be considered as a means by
which to encourage very large firms to trim their operations when ex-
cessive size and variety are reached; anxious to forestall takeover, other-
wise passive firms may be induced voluntarily to exercise restraint. The
limits of competition in the capital market in this respect, however, need
more fully to be assessed.
The multinational corporation might also be examined in an insti-
tutional failures context.1 To what extent is it a response to alleged im-
perfections in the capital market? What organizational structures have
evolved to support this form of operation, and what limitations (organiza-
tional failures) does it What present and potential antitrust
problems are posed, and is a corresponding multinational extension of
the antitrust machinery indicated? Even if many of the
projections of "world by multinational corporations are re-
garded as that they reflect insufficient appreciation of the
limits of internal organization—serious public policy issues may, in
individual instances at least, nevertheless be posed.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
It is argued that the study of firm and market structures, and the appli-
cation of antitrust policy thereto, can benefit from a more systematic
examination of the sources and consequences of market failure and by a
more thorough assessment of the powers and limits of internal organiza-
tion. More specifically, market failure analysis ought to admit
to the possibility of default and chance event failures—especially with
reference to dominant industries.Similarly, the "transactional"
limitations that interfirm exchange is subject to warrant explication as
these bear on vertical integration. The substitution of internal organiza-
tion against failures in the capital market, especially as this relates to an
10Foran elaboration Of the issues discussed in this paragraph, see Turner
and Williamson. Also see Peck, and Kalachek (1967).32 Economic Research: Retrospect andProspect
assessment of conglomerate organization, likewise deserves attention.
The influence of organization form on enterprise performance, and of
organizational innovation in general, also merit study. Of particular pub-
lic policy interest is the possibility of inducing or otherwise supporting
voluntary divestiture by giant-sized enterprises.
A survey of the literature on the modern corporation reveals that
industrial organization specialists have mainly been bystanders. Partly
this is to be explained by the prevailing opinion that the industry, not the
firm, is the relevant unit of analysis. But however correct this may be
for some purposes, it is less obviously true in others. If one of the most
remarkable attributes of American capitalism is its adaptive capacity to
invent efficient and viable organization forms in response to changing
technological, market, and organizational conditions, to characterize the
system in conventional industry terms, to the neglect of internal organiza-
tion, easily misses much of what accounts for its most significant ac-
complishments.
REFERENCES
Kenneth J. Arrow (1969). "The Organization of Economic Activity:Issues
Pertinent to the Choice of Market versus Nonmarket Allocation." In The
Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PPB System, Vol. 1. Joint
Economic Committee, 91st Cong., 1st sess., Washington, D.C., 1969, pp. 47—64.
W. J. Baumol (1965). The Stock Market and Economic Efficiency, New York.
W. J. Baumol, Peggy Heim, B. G. Malkiel, and R. E. Quandt (1970). "Earnings
Retention, New Capital, and the Growth of the Firm." Review of Economics
and Statistics, November, pp. 345—55.
0. S. Becker (1965). "A Theory of the Allocation of Time." Economic Journal,
September, pp. 493—517.
Yale Brozen (1970). "The Antitrust Task Force Deconcentration Recommenda-
tion." Journal of Law and Economics, October, pp. 279—92.
A. D. Chandler, Jr. (1966). Strategy and Structure. New York.
Ronald H. Coase (1937). "The Nature of the Firm." Economica, November.
Reprinted in George J.Stigler and Kenneth E. Boulding, eds. Readings in
Price Theory. Homewood, Ill., 1952, pp. 331—51.
C. D. Edwards (1955). "Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power." In Business
Concentration and Price Policy. Princeton, 1955.
Federal Trade Commission Staff Study (1969). Economic Report on Corporate
Mergers. Washington, D.C.
Carl Kaysen and D. F. Turner (1959). Antitrust Policy, Cambridge, Mass.
Henry 0. Manne (1955). "Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control."
Journal of Political Economy, April, pp. 110—20.
Jacob Marschak (1968). "Economics of Inquiring, Communicating, Deciding."
American Economic Review, May, pp. 1—18.
Neale Task Force Report (1969). "Report of the White House Task Force onIndustrial Organization 33
Antitrust Policy." BNA Antitrust and Trade Regulation Report, No. 411, Special
Supplement, Part II, May 27, pp. 1—28.
R. R. Nelson, M. J. Peck,and E. D. Kalachek (1967). Technology, Economic
Growth, and Public Policy. Washington, D.C.
R. A. Posner (1969). and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach."
Stanford Law Review, June, pp. 1562—1606.
(1970). "A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement." Journal of Law and
Economics, October, pp. 365—420.
F. M. Scherer (1970). Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance.
Chicago.
G. J. Stigler (1951). "The. Division of Labor Is Limited by the Extent of the
Market." Journal of Polilical Economy, June, pp. 185—93.
(1968). The Organization of Industry. Chicago.
G. W. Stocking (1955). "Conglomerate Bigness: Comment." In Business Concen-
tration and Price Policy. Princeton, pp. 352—59.
D. F. Turner (1969). Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory
Policies." Harvard Law April, pp. 1207—44.
D. F. Turner and 0. E. Williamson (forthcoming). "Market Structure in Relation
to Technical and Organizational Innovation."
Andrew Whinston "Price Guides in Decentralized Organizations." In
W. W. Cooper, H. ).Leavitt,and M. W. Shelly, II, eds. New Perspectives in
Organization Research. New York, pp. 405—48.
0. E. Williamson (1970). Corporate Control and Business Behavior. Englewood
Cliffs, N.J.
(1971). "The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Con-
siderations." American Economic Review, May.